Westinghouse has received 30 billion dollars from the department of energy to build their traditional meltdown fukushima horror nuclear power plant. Called the AP1000, it is supposed to be a newer safer design than the rotting plants across the nation. It is not. It has all the same failure issues of existing BOMB design plants.

  1. It has a ridiculous amount of nuclear fuel all in one place that cannot be easily moved
  2. It is a pressure chamber filled with water which explodes when contacting 5,000 degree cores
  3. It uses “control rods” which fail under high heat
  4. It places trust in concrete and steel for containment, both of which turn to mush at meltdown heat levels

The alternative spider arm reactor solves all these issues.

1 – It has a minimal amount of fuel which moves apart upon failure

2 – It has no pressure chamber and no water. Instead, a power exchange tube filled with molten salt is heated and circulates to an external pool of water far away generating steam in a distant place for turbines.

3- It uses no control rods

4 – It places zero trust in concrete, steel or water. It uses Tantalum Hafnium Carbide shielding under the core and tube repository areas. This expensive yet amazing material can withstand reactor meltdown temperatures. It cools the reaction if needed by spraying liquid Helium or H3 which also slows neutron movement. Rods are de-commisioned with this application as well making their radioactivity easily managed.

Melting Points:

THC – 7,214 °F

STEEL – 2,500 F

Concrete – 1600 F

Temperature of Molten Fissioning Uranium – 5,500 F

Steel and Concrete at this temperature – MUSH

Water at this temperature – Instantly explodes without change to gas state

5- It is a completely passive safety design. remove power and it shuts down.

6- It has none of the issues with dust and inefficiency with coated and pebble reactor designs including embedded marble coated uranium ball salt fluid reactor designs (which admittedly are a huge step forward from the BOMB design.

We built our nuclear reactors like bombs and they explode like bombs. While the AP1000 will be built, and starting to re-build nuclear reactors is a good thing because our 1960s reactors are now crumbling, it is NOT the design to move forward with. It is a dangerous design.

Finally, if/when the AP1000 explodes like Fukushima, how long will it be before the IRWST runs out. Hours? A day? And then what is the plan?


In-vessel Retention of Core Damage. The AP1000 plant is designed to drain the high capacity in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) water into the reactor cavity in the event that the core has overheated. This provides cooling on the outside of the reactor vessel preventing reactor vessel failure and subsequent spilling of molten core debris into the containment.

Retention of debris in the vessel significantly reduces uncertainty in the assessment of containment failure and radioactive release to the environment due to ex-vessel severe accident phenomena such as the interaction of molten core material with concrete.

Fission Product Release. Fuel cladding provides the first barrier to the release of radiation in the highly unlikely event of an accident. The reactor coolant pressure boundary, in particular the reactor pressure vessel and the reactor coolant piping, provide independent barriers to prevent the release of radiation. Furthermore, in conjunction with the surrounding shield building, the steel containment vessel provides additional protection by establishing a third barrier and by providing natural convection air currents to cool the steel containment. The natural convection cooling can be enhanced with evaporative cooling by allowing water to drain from a large tank located at the top of the shield building on to the steel containment.

Large Safety Margins

The AP1000 PWR meets the U.S. NRC deterministic-safety and probabilistic-risk criteria with large margins. The safety analysis is documented in the AP1000 plant Design Control Document (DCD) and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). Results of the PRA show a very low core damage frequency (CDF) that is 1/100 of the CDF of currently operating plants and 1/20 of the CDF deemed acceptable in the Utility Requirements Document for new, advanced reactor designs. It follows that the AP1000 plant also improves upon the probability of large release goals for advanced reactor designs in the event of a severe accident scenario to retain the molten core within the reactor vessel