They are blacks fleeing from black shit-hole nations, that they themselves created. Nothing more.  They are low IQ violent raping savages who seek to live off government handouts, rape the local women, and never contribute anything to society except endless babies who ALSO will live off welfare.

 

inflow


The massive influx of refugees to Europe is the most
serious crisis that the European Union has faced since
its foundation. Even if the recent EU–Turkey agreement
succeeds in permanently closing the Balkan route, through
which hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants have
made their way into the EU over the past year, the crisis will
be far from over. With the war in Syria continuing and no
sign of stabilisation in North African countries such as Libya
or Egypt, there will be further flows of displaced people
looking for safety, and closing down one path into Europe
will merely divert them to other routes.
Already, migrant flows have stretched the ties between EU
member states, and even within some states, to their limits.
A rift has emerged between a core of the older member
states – particularly Germany – on the one hand, and the
more recent members in Central and Eastern Europe on
the other, with accusations from both that the other camp
has violated EU norms. In many European countries, the
refugee inflow has strengthened right-wing, xenophobic,
and anti-EU parties. In Germany’s March 2016 elections,
the anti-immigration party Alternative for Germany (AfD)
entered all three regional parliaments that held a vote. In
countries such as Poland and France, the mere prospect of
larger refugee inflows has fuelled a growth in support for
far-right parties.
A central fear of European voters is that refugee inflows
could overwhelm their countries economically. In national
debates, the recurrent concern is that refugee inflows
will increase unemployment, strain infrastructure, and
burden already fragile public budgets beyond the point of
PAYING THE PRICE:
THE COST OF EUROPE’S
REFUGEE CRISIS
Sebastian Dullien
2PAYING THE PRICE: THE COST OF EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS http://www.ecfr.eu ECFR/168 April 2016
sustainability, pushing countries back into the debt crisis
they have only just escaped.
Against this background of turmoil, this paper will assess
the economic sustainability of refugee flows into the EU,
and propose ways to make them more sustainable. Its
core proposal is the establishment of a “European Refugee
Union” that centralises key policies on refugees and asylum,
as well as their financing, at the European level. While
moving towards such a comprehensive solution any time
soon is of course a utopia, this paper offers an ideal model
that can be used as a reference point for debate over more
immediate measures.
The focus on the economic aspects of the crisis is not
meant to neglect its humanitarian urgency, but is rather
an attempt to maximise the number of people in need that
the EU can help. Economic sustainability – managing the
inflow in a way that can be sustained for an extended period
– is a fundamental aspect of any durable solution to the
humanitarian crisis. As there is a limit to the number of
refugees that can sustainably be taken in by EU member
states, helping each refugee in a more economically efficient
way means that more can be offered protection. The basic
notion is that Europe can only help others if it is not itself
overwhelmed and pushed to the brink of economic or
government crisis.
The economic sustainability of refugee flows
There are two important dimensions to the sustainability
of refugee inflows: fiscal and political. On the fiscal
side, receiving, processing, housing, feeding, and finally
integrating refugees into the labour market comes with
significant upfront costs, worsening the country’s fiscal
position, even though fiscal benefits might come later, once
migrants have been integrated into the labour market.1
On
the political economy side, the danger is that a large share of
the population feels itself to be economically disadvantaged
by refugee inflows, and turns to extremist forces that
change the country’s stance on hosting refugees (either by
putting xenophobic forces into government or by pressuring
mainstream parties to change their position).
Fiscal sustainability
While it is sometimes argued that migrants are beneficial
per se to an ageing society, in fact migrants only help
economically to mitigate the demographic challenge if they
are integrated into the labour market and become net payers
into the fiscal system. An 18-year-old refugee who remains
unemployed, relying on transfers or welfare payments, for
the rest of his or her life does not make the ageing of a society
more bearable, but burdens social systems with additional
costs at a time when they are already under stress.
1 Shekhar Aiyar, Bergljot Barkbu, Nicoletta Batini et al., “The Refugee Surge in Europe:
Economic Challenges”, IMF Staff Discussion Note 16/02, January 2016, available at
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1602.pdf (hereafter, IMF Staff
Discussion Note, 2016).
Thus, for the question of fiscal sustainability, integration
into the labour market is crucial. This does not mean that the
fastest way of putting migrants to work is always the most
sustainable. Placing a Syrian physician in a construction
job might allow him or her to start work immediately, but
might also mean that that person’s human capital remains
underutilised in the long term, limiting his or her ability to
pay taxes and make social-security contributions. Instead,
it is crucial to tailor training and integration programmes,
which will cost extra money in the beginning.
Even if migrants have the potential to deliver net fiscal
benefits over their lifetime, it is difficult for some countries
to make the necessary upfront investments. At present
(especially after the global financial crisis and the euro
crisis), a number of countries in the eurozone cannot take
their debt sustainability for granted. This is particularly the
case for Greece,2
where debt relief is being discussed as part
of loan packages from its European partners and from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Spain, Portugal, Italy,
and Belgium also have debt-to-GDP ratios above 100 percent.
For these countries, taking in refugees poses a substantial
fiscal challenge. The IMF estimates the costs of refugee inflows
to the EU at an average of 0.1–0.2 percent of GDP,3
but this
is probably too low. First, it does not include all refugees that
arrived in 2015, and makes no provision for more arriving in
2016. Second, the number is calculated on the basis of costs
already incurred, which in many countries do not yet include
training and integration programmes. Back-of-the-envelope
calculations presented later in this paper suggest that the cost
of the refugee crisis for Europe (including external activities
in neighbouring countries) will be as high as 0.5 percent of
GDP, given a total inflow of 3.5 million refugees.
Political-economic sustainability
The question of political-economic sustainability is
closely linked to the state of the labour market. While the
economic analysis generally comes to the conclusion that,
over the medium term, migrant inflows neither increase
unemployment nor depress the wages of the existing
population (and might actually boost wages),4 this is not
necessarily true in the short term. Migrant workers compete
for jobs, especially with low-skilled workers, and there is
some evidence that a large inflow of migrants depresses
lower-end wages.5
The impact will be felt more strongly if
unemployment is already high.
2 “Greece: An Update of IMF Staff’s Preliminary Public Debt Sustainability Analysis”,
IMF Country Report No. 15/186, 14 July 2015, available at https://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15186.pdf.
3 IMF Staff Discussion Note, 2016.
4 For a literature survey, see Sari P. Kerr and William Kerr, “Economic Impacts of
Immigration: A Survey”, Finnish Economic Papers, 24 (1): 1–32, 2011; or Simonetta
Longhi, Peter Nijkamp, and Jacques Poot, “A Meta-Analytic Assessment of the Effects of
Immigration on Wages”, Journal of Economic Surveys, 19: 451–77, 2005.
5 See, for example, George J. Borjas, “The Economic Benefits from Immigration”, Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 9 (2): 3–22, 1995; or, for deeper analysis, Abdurrahman
Aydemir and George J. Borjas, “A Comparative Analysis of the Labor Market Impact of
International Migration: Canada, Mexico, and the United States”, Journal of the European
Economic Association, 5: 663–708, 2007; Abdurrahman Aydemir and George J. Borjas,
“Attenuation Bias in Measuring the Wage Impact of Immigration”, Journal of Labor
Economics, 29 (1): 69–112, 2011.
3
Data
Based on these arguments, we have gathered data on the
fiscal outlook, labour market, and poverty levels for each
member state for 2015, along with the number of asylum
applications in that year, in order to assess the economic and
political sustainability of the recent surge of refugee flows into
the EU. This gives a snapshot of each country’s capacity to
take in refugees prior to the surge of late 2015, as the burden
of those arrivals is in general not yet reflected in the data.
For example, refugees who arrived in that year – particularly
in the autumn or winter – would not yet be counted in
unemployment figures, and would not have received much
financial support, particularly in terms of longer-term and
more expensive training or integration programmes.
Each element is graded on a traffic-light system – red does not
necessarily mean that a country cannot take in more refugees,
but that it is more likely to experience problems with additional
arrivals than those coloured yellow or green. The colouring
should be understood in relative rather than absolute terms.
According to the data, 16 member states are yellow or
green over all dimensions, suggesting that these countries
would not face serious economic problems hosting and
integrating a significant number of additional refugees.
The other 12 are red in at least one dimension, indicating
that large refugee inflows could lead to problems. In
particular, countries hard hit by the euro crisis, such as
Spain or Greece, have limited economic capacity to finance
a large additional refugee population.
Interestingly, no dimension lights up as red across Europe.
This indicates that the EU as a whole is capable of taking
in more refugees than the sum of its member states. While
some countries face fiscal constraints in supporting refugees,
they might have labour market conditions that allow for the
relatively easy integration of refugees. If the fiscal burden of
the refugee inflow could be separated from the actual hosting,
it would be cheaper and easier overall to integrate refugees, as
each country could contribute in its area of strength.
The following indicators and criteria were used:
Fiscal outlook: The table gives the projected debt level
for each country in 2021 if its economy grows 3.5 percent in
nominal terms annually (2 percent inflation and 1.5 percent
real GDP growth), assuming that costs for refugee inflows of
0.5 percent of GDP6
are financed by additional borrowing.
Countries in which the debt-to-GDP level is projected to be
above 100 percent in 2021 (levels associated with market
mistrust) are red, countries with a projected debt-to-GDP
level of between 60 and 100 percent (above the Maastricht
threshold, but usually not seen as critical by financial markets)
are yellow, and countries with a projected debt-to-GDP level of
under 60 percent (below the Maastricht threshold) are green.
6 As discussed below, a realistic estimate of the costs of dealing with a large refugee inflow,
equally distributed to all EU28 member states, would amount to roughly 0.5 percent of
GDP.
Labour market:
• Current level of unemployment: The table gives
the current level of unemployment in member
states, on the grounds that refugees will be more
easily integrated if unemployment is low. Given
an average EU unemployment rate of around 10
percent, national rates below 7.5 percent are green
(significantly better than the EU average), rates
between 7.5 percent and 12.5 percent are yellow,
and rates above 12.5 percent are red (significantly
worse than the average).
• Change in unemployment rate: The table gives the
change in the unemployment rate from prior to the
2008–2009 financial crisis until today. When the
situation of the native population has deteriorated
markedly, growing competition for jobs from
migrants is more likely to cause conflicts. Countries
that have seen a decline or marginal increase (up to
one percentage point) in unemployment since 2007
are green, those where the unemployment rate has
increased by up to 5 percentage points are yellow,
and those where unemployment has increased by
more than 5 percentage points are red.
Poverty: The table gives the share of the population at risk
of poverty according to the standard EU definition. The
rationale is that countries that struggle to prevent the native
population from sliding into poverty have less capacity to
aid newcomers. Moreover, when a large part of the existing
population suffers from deprivation, it might be politically
more difficult to divert resources to migrants.
Countries where less than 20 percent of the population are
at risk of poverty are green, countries with 20 to 27.5 percent
at risk are yellow, and countries with more than 27.5 percent
at risk are red.
Asylum applications: The number of asylum applications
registered in 2015 is used as a proxy for the number of refugees
that each country is supporting. This probably understates
the true figure, but it is difficult to say by how much. It
includes those who may be deported once their applications
are rejected, but neglects those who arrived before 2015 and
those who have not yet filed claims. For example, in Germany,
more than 1.1 million refugees have been registered in the
electronic filing system upon arrival, but the total number of
asylum applications in 2015 was only half that. Meanwhile, a
large number of refugees currently in Greece have not applied
for asylum, as they intend to move on.